Changes in the Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Original and Successor Liability by Kelly, Peter B.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 67
Issue 4 Summer 1984 Article 9
Changes in the Ownership of Hazardous Waste
Disposal Sites: Original and Successor Liability
Peter B. Kelly
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Peter B. Kelly, Changes in the Ownership of Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Original and Successor Liability, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 691
(1984).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol67/iss4/9
COMMENTS
CHANGES IN THE OWNERSHIP OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL SITES:
ORIGINAL AND SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Hazardous Waste Problem
Just as the major ecological issues of the 1960s and 1970s
involved air and water quality, the environmental focus of
the 1980s and 1990s should be hazardous waste' pollution
throughout America. With the dawning of the 1980s, this
nation's continuing fight against environmental degradation
has spread into a completely new theatre of war, and recent
battlefields named Love Canal, New York and Times Beach,
Missouri are now silent memorials to America's early losses
to improperly disposed chemical wastes. But the skirmishes
have only just begun. The number of casualties from expo-
sure to harmful pollutants is expected to rise in the future
along with an increase in personal injury legal claims that
some authorities say within ten years will keep lawyers bus-
ier than products liabilities claims will keep them.2 The De-
partment of Justice and the Environmental Protection
Agency have termed the improper disposal of hazardous
wastes generated by private industry the "most serious envi-
ronmental problem of the day."' 3 One expert even warns
that "the potential dangers toxic wastes pose to the country's
land, water, air, public health and economy are second only
1. While definitions of hazardous wastes vary widely in state legislation, gener-
ally they include any wastes "posing a present or potential hazard to human health
because of toxicity, nondegradability, persistence in nature or susceptibility to biolog-
ical magnification." W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 6.10, at 689 n.l (1977) (cit-
ing S. 1086 and H.R. 4873, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(4) (1973), the proposed Hazardous
Waste Management Act of 1973).
2. Quade, Pollution Boom, 69 A.B.A. J. 149 (1983).
3. Note, Strict Liabilityfor Generators, Transporters, and Disposers ofHazardous
Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949, 949 & n.2 (1980) (citing 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1275
(1979), which quotes Department of Justice attorney Barry Trilling at a meeting of
the Federal Bar Association on September 28, 1979).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
to the threat of nuclear war."4
The risk of harm from hazardous waste is particularly
frightening because it is impossible to determine what the
short and long -term effects of the myriad chemical mixtures
which fill the dump sites around the country will be or how
many sites actually exist. Some experts estimate that in as
many as 50,000 dumps nationwide toxic chemicals may be
found and that America's industrial parks contain dangerous
wastes in 180,000 open pits, ponds and lagoons.- The EPA
estimates that U.S. businesses of all sizes generate some
forty-six million tons of toxic wastes a year, ninety percent of
which is disposed of improperly.6
The dump sites of Wisconsin unfortunately mirror the
national picture. The statistics are alarming. According to
some estimates, hazardous wastes in this state are generated
at the rate of 500,000 tons per year.7 Some sources suggest
that of all the hazardous waste generated in Wisconsin in
1979 only twenty percent was deposited in disposal areas
designed to take this kind of refuse.8 Although it is difficult
to accurately determine the number of abandoned waste
sites throughout Wisconsin,9 it is estimated that there may be
up to 4,000 within state boundaries.10 Of the approximately
1,200 landfill sites currently licensed by the Wisconsin De-
partment of Natural Resources - Bureau of Solid Waste
Management, only three of these sites are licensed to accept
hazardous wastes." However, as of January 25, 1983, even
these three were no longer accepting hazardous wastes.
4. The Toxic-Waste Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1983, at 20 (quoting Samuel
Epstein).
5. Id. See also Quade, supra note 2, at 149; Note, supra note 3, at 950 & n.6.
6. Note, supra note 3, at 950 & n.6. But see Mott, Liabilityfor Cleanup ofInactive
Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 379, 379 & n.l (1981-82).
7. Harrington, The Right to a Decent Burial- Hazardous Waste and Its Regulation
in Wisconsin, 66 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 223 (1983).
8. Id. at 223 & n. 1 (citing Everybody's Yuk: Hazardous Waste Management in
Wisconsin, 5 Wis. NAT. RESOURCES, July-Aug. 1981, at 12s).
9. Harrington, supra note 7, at 223.
10. Id. at 223 & n.2 (citing Romano, The Siting Dilemma, 5 Wis. NAT. RE-
SOURCES, July-Aug. 1981, at 2s).
11. Harrington, supra note 7, at 223 & nn.3 & 4 (citing Irwin, DNA- Exorcist/or
Old Dumps, 5 Wis. NAT. RESOURCES, July-Aug. 1981, at 9s, and Hirsch, Franklin
Landfill to End Handling of Toxic Wastes, Milwaukee J., Jan. 25, 1983, at Local News
Page 1, col. 5).
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Thus, at present there is not a single hazardous waste dispo-
sal facility operating in Wisconsin.12
The wastes deposited in dump sites present a serious
danger to nearby residents. Toxic chemicals not only
threaten the people and animals who come into direct physi-
cal contact with them but they also contaminate ground-
water, pose fire hazards, poison vegetation and emit noxious
fumes. The contamination of groundwater, which is often a
source of drinking water, is especially serious because it may
lead to the gradual undetected poisoning of an entire com-
munity which shares the polluted water supply. Further-
more, the purification of groundwater after contamination
by toxic wastes is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish by artificial means. Even if the natural cleansing
process is allowed to work, it may take thousands of years
for a contaminated aquifer to flush itself of pollutants.
B. Legal Issues
As the threat of hazardous wastes spreads across the na-
tion, so too do the economic pressures on small businesses,
and especially those which produce, handle or dispose of
hazardous wastes. When the industrial climate becomes
more onerous these waste-related businesses are subject to
changes in ownership and liquidation or sale of their prop-
erty. In this manner, the tainted real property of a failing
hazardous waste producer or disposer may, either by acci-
dent or deceit, become the bargain platt for a new housing
development,13 crop or pasture land for livestock, or the site
of a new elementary school or playground. Subsequent in-
jury resulting from the use of, or association with, this con-
taminated land may lead to litigation wherein difficult legal
questions will arise. These questions include determination
of the causation or source of the injury, computation of
damages including the future consequences of the injury,
12. Harrington, supra note 7, at 223 n.4 (citing Hirsch, Frankin Landfill to End
Handling of Toxic Wastes, Milwaukee J., Jan. 25, 1983, at Local News Page 1, col. 5).
13. One couple in Cleveland, Ohio, began digging a foundation for a new back-
yard barbeque grill. They uncovered more than 5,000 pounds of radioactive waste
materials. Quade, supra note 2, at 149.
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and allocation of liability among successive owners of the
disposal site.
The allocation of liability among successive owners of a
disposal site is one of the most troublesome waste issues en-
countered in the courts. 14 Such allocation involves difficult
questions because the degree of participation in the disposal
action and knowledge of each owner varies and frequently
the most culpable party has disappeared or become
insolvent. 5
In cases involving successive owners of contaminated
property, there are two forms of liability which may be im-
posed upon a current landowner. The first is the original
liability of the current landowner for the wrongful acts com-
mitted while possessing the land. The second is the liability
of the current landowner for the wrongful acts of a predeces-
sor in title to the same property. This latter type is termed
successor liability. Although both types of liability may exist
in a particular case, they do not necessarily follow one an-
other. The rules for the establishment of each are separate
and distinct. These rules are well established in the common
law of all American jurisdictions. However, some confusion
between the two may be encountered in the typical hazard-
ous waste contamination case when the plaintiff seeks to es-
tablish both types of liability. Further questions may also
arise when state or federal statutes are encountered which
modify the common-law rules that establish both types of
liability.
This comment seeks to dissipate the confusion among
these two forms of liability and the statutory modifications.
First, the two principal methods of establishing abatement
and damage liability of a party associated with a hazardous
waste site are presented. Both the state and federal statutory
remedies and the common law of nuisance are discussed.
Second, the traditional rule of corporate successor nonliabil-
ity and four exceptions to this rule are explained. The anal-
ysis continues with a consideration of how both
14. Mott, supra note 6, at 413. See also Note, Inactive or Abandoned Hazardous
Waste Disposal Sites: Coping with a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1709, 1710-11
(1980).
15. Mott, supra note 6, at 413.
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successorship and nuisance law may combine to cause a
transferee of contaminated property to become liable not
only for the post-transfer damages of the existing nuisance,
but also for pre-transfer nuisance damages arising from the
acts of the transferor as predecessor in title. Next, the devel-
opment of the relationship between these two forms of liabil-
ity in Wisconsin hazardous waste cases is considered.
Finally, the analysis presents several specific federal and
state statutes which either modify or supplant the common-
law rules of nuisance and successor liability.16
II. THEORIES By WHICH INJURED PARTIES MAY SUE
There are five bases for the imposition of liability on the
owners and operators of a disposal site for cleanup costs and
personal injury damages. They include statutory provisions,
common-law negligence, trespass, strict liability and, most
frequently, nuisance. With the exception of statutory provi-
sions, all of these causes of action are subject to common-
law standards for the allocation of liability between prior
and current owners of waste disposal sites.17
16. See generally Cohen & Derkics, FinanciaiResponsibihyfor Hazardous Waste
Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 509 (1980); Hamlin & Kurzman, Tort Liability of Successor
Corporations, 5 MICH. CORP. FINANCE & Bus. L.J. 1 (1981); Hanabach, Toxic Torts-
Is Strict Liability Really the "Fair and Just" Way to Compensate the Victimsz 16 U.
RICH. L. REv. 305 (1982); Comment, Pursuing a Cause ofAction in Hazardous Waste
Pollution Cases, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 533 (1980); Comment, Establishing Liabilityfor
the Damagesfrom Hazardous Wastes: An Alternative Routefor Love Canal Plaintiffs,
31 CATH. U.L. REv. 273 (1982); Comment, Common Law & the Toxic Tort: Where
Does Super/und Leave the Private Victims of Toxic Torts?, 86 DICK. L. REv. 725
(1982); Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims: RCRA, Insurance Regu-
lations and a Not So "'Super" FundAct, 11 ENVTL. L. 689 (1981); Note, Liabilityfor
Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms, 69
GEo. L.J. 1047 (1981); Comment, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances Pollu-
tion: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1981);
Comment, Joint & SeveralLiability Under Super/una 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 489 (1982);
Comment, Extension of Strict Tort Liability to Successor Corporations, 61 MARQ. L.
REv. 595 (1978); Note, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980: Is Joint and Several Liability the Answer to Superund?, 18
NEw ENG. L. REv. 109 (1982-83); Comment, The Development of a Strict Liability
Cause oActionfor Personal Injuries Resulting From Hazardous Waste, 16 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 543 (1980-81); Comment, Generator Liability Under Superfundfor Clean-up of
Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsite, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1229 (1982).
17. Mott, supra note 6, at 413.
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Although all five bases are available, this analysis will
consider only the statutory and nuisance approaches as these
are most frequently utilized in hazardous waste cases. Be-
cause most plaintiffs choose to rely on negligence for claims
of injury from exposure to hazardous wastes18 only in con-
junction with other bases of liability, negligence will not be
discussed separately. Likewise, trespass theory will not be
discussed because it has not been a notably successful ap-
proach in establishing liability in pollution cases.' 9 Finally,
although all states have established strict liability for harm
caused by certain activities, few decisions based on strict lia-
bility are reported which directly involve parties responsible
for hazardous industrial wastes.20 Therefore, strict liability
theory will also not be analyzed in relation to the topic of
successor liability in hazardous waste cases.
A. Statutory Bases of Liability
Several federal statutes underlie the U.S. Government's
enforcement actions for the abatement and cleanup of inac-
tive waste disposal sites. These include the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 ("Superfund"),21 the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act's imminent hazard section 7003,22 the Clean
Water Act,23 the Refuse Act of 1899,24 the Safe Drinking
Water Act,25 the Clean Air Act,26 the Toxic Substances Con-
18. STAFF OF SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP (printed for the use of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works), 97TH Cong., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND
DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL
REMEDIES, Part 1, at 83 (Comm. Print September 1982) [hereinafter cited as 301(e)
Report].
19. Note, supra note 3, at 960 & nn.58-61.
20. Slap, Generator Liabilityfor Hazardous Wastes, 5 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 95, 95-96
(1980) (citing Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct.
App. 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979); Curry Coal Co. v. M.C. Arnoni
Co., 439 Pa. 114, 266 A.2d 678 (1970)).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. IV 1982). See also Mott, supra note 6, at 380; Note,
supra note 3, at 952.
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also Mott, supra note 6,
at 386; Note, supra note 3, at 954-55.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also Mott, supra note 6, at 388-
89.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Mott, supra note 6, at
389; Note, supra note 3, at 955.
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trol Act,27 and the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act.28 Some writers suggest that while as many as twenty
federal statutes regulate solid wastes, only five have a signifi-
cant impact on hazardous waste disposal and none provide
for the compensation of hazardous waste victims. 29 These
five statutes generally offer a private citizen only the right to
sue for enforcement of the statutory provisions. Only in a
few limited situations do the statutes authorize compensa-
tion for cleanup costs.3 0
The problems hazardous wastes pose to the environment
and the public have been recognized by most states.3 ' Con-
sequently, many states have enacted statutes intended to pre-
vent the discharge of toxic chemicals or to provide for rapid
cleanup of accidental toxic spills.32 Virtually all state legisla-
tures have attempted through hazardous substance control
acts, solid waste management acts and environmental qual-
ity laws, to regulate hazardous waste facilities, allocate re-
sponsibility of spill costs, and provide for the state's recovery
of damages.33 However, very few state legislatures have ad-
dressed the question of recovery by private plaintiffs for
waste-related personal injury damages including damages
caused by illness resulting from waste discharges.3 4 Among
the states which have considered the problem and enacted
remedial statutes, three different approaches are used .3
The first and most common statutory approach provides
that the state legislation does not deny private plaintiffs the
right to sue polluters through common law or other statutory
remedies.36 These statutes also grant the attorney general or
other state official the right to represent the state in a suit for
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See also Mott, supra note 6, at 390.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(1) (1982). See also Mott, supra note 6, at 390.
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See also Note, supra note 3,
at 956.
29. Note, supra note 3, at 952 & n.9 (citing W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAWv
§ 6.10, at 691 (1977)). See also Note, supra note 14, at 1719.
30. See generally Costle, Introduction, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 661 (1978).
31. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 2, at 131.
32. Id See also id., Part 1, at 60, for a detailed discussion of these statutes.
33. Id., Part 2, at 131.
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id at 132.
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recovery of pollution-caused damages it has incurred.37
However, while this type of statute gives the state the power
to collect damages for the discharge of a hazardous sub-
stance, a private plaintiff has merely the existing statutory
and common-law remedies.38
The second type of statute provides funds for the emer-
gency cleanup of a hazardous waste spill or leak.39 How-
ever, the use of these funds is restricted to containing,
removing or mitigating the hazardous chemical discharge
and its effects.4° Private injury or damage claims upon the
emergency spill response funds are not expressly allowed.41
Thirteen states have statutory provisions concerning the fi-
nancial responsibility of operators of toxic chemical dump
sites. However, six of these statutes are only concerned with
the operator's funds for maintenance, operation, closure or
perpetual care and do not address funds which are needed to
cover liability for injury or property damage.42
Finally, a number of states have attempted to assist an
injured plaintiff by enacting provisions which provide for
strict liability, joint and several liability or a presumption of
causation.43 But even statutes which help a plaintiff on some
37. Id.
38. Id. at 131-32 & nn.l-13. These statutes, in current form, are: HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 342-16 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-108(8)(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2,
§ 1022.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.995(3) (1982); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:1074(4) (West Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1306-c(5)
(Supp. 1983); MD. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 8-1403 (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 260.425(7) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.321 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 74-6-13 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-40-04 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 6018.607 (Purdon Supp. 1983); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 § 10 (Vernon
Supp. 1984).
39. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 2, at 133 & nn.16-30. These statutes, in
current form, are: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2805 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 29-22-105 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451 (West Supp. 1984); GA.
CODE § 12-8-81 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1022.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1143, 30:1149 (West Supp. 1984); MD. HEALTH
ENV. CODE ANN. § 7-220 (Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.609-.610
(1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.95, (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-4-8
(1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.87 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.701 (Pur-
don Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-46-204 (Supp. 1983); Wis. STAT. § 144.76(6)
(1981-82).
40. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 2, at 133.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 134.
43. Id at 131.
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issues fail to provide needed assistance on others and there-
fore may still be considered inadequate. 44
While several state and federal environmental statutes
provide for civil or criminal actions against those who vio-
late statutory or regulatory standards, 45 statutory provisions
allowing for recovery of property damage by private plain-
tiffs are rare.46 Even more uncommon are statutory provi-
sions which provide recovery for personal injury to private
plaintiffs. 47 At least five states have established private stat-
utory causes of action for personal injury resulting from haz-
ardous waste.48 A recent example of such legislation is the
Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act
(MERLA) enacted in 1983. 49 This Act will be discussed in
detail in part IV.50
Unfortunately, Wisconsin has not yet adopted any statu-
tory scheme similar to Minnesota's Environmental Response
and Liability Act to deal comprehensively with questions of
liability and compensation for hazardous waste damages.
Wisconsin's existing statutory provisions for waste abate-
ment, cleanup, and liability are contained in Chapter 144
which concerns water, sewage, refuse, mining, and air pollu-
tion and Chapter 107 which deals with mining and metal
recovery. These chapters contain the Wisconsin Hazardous
Waste Management Act5 and the Wisconsin Metallic Min-
ing Reclamation Act.52 Several other sections included in
these chapters deal with the liability of mining companies
44. Id at 132.
45. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 57 & n.82.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 57 & n.83.
48. Id. at 60 & n.96 (citing Alaska, North Carolina, North Dakota and Rhode
Island as being the "only four states (which) have created private statutory causes of
action for personal injury due to hazardous wastes"). But see Minnesota Environ-
mental Response and Liability Act, MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.01-.24 (West Supp.
1984).
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.01-.24 (West Supp. 1984). See generally Espel, The
Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, 16 NAT. REsouRcEs LAW. 407
(1983).
50. See infra notes 207-20 and accompanying text.
51. Wis. STAT. §§ 144.60-.74 (1981-82). See also Wis. STAT. § 144.76-.79 (1981-
82).
52. Wis. STAT. §§ 144.80-.94 (1981-82).
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and changes in ownership of mining sites,5 3 the transfer of
responsibility for ownership of a hazardous waste facility, 54
financial responsibility after the sale of a hazardous waste
facility,-' and emergency cleanup funds for hazardous waste
spills.56
B. The Nuisance Theory of Liability
Plaintiffs in groundwater contamination cases have been
more successful when relying on the nuisance theory of lia-
bility than on either trespass or negligence theories.57 One
authority has commented on the reason for the relatively
greater success and importance of nuisance theory to envi-
ronmental law:
The deepest doctrinal roots of modem environmental
law are found in principles of nuisance .... There is sim-
ply no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in
comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and
of technological abuse. . . . Nuisance actions have chal-
lenged virtually every major industrial and municipal ac-
tivity which is today the subject of comprehensive
environmental regulation - the operation of landfills, in-
cinerators, sewage treatment facilities, activities at chemi-
cal plants, . . . and a host of other manufacturing
activities .... Nuisance theory and case law is the com-
mon law backbone of modem environmental and energy
law. 58
Other writers suggest that the success of the private nui-
sance theory partially lies in its protection of the use and
enjoyment of one's land from substantial interference and its
concern for the right of the injured party rather than focus-
ing on the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct.5 9
Yet other observers believe that only relatively minor dis-
putes between isolated neighbors are effectively solved by
the doctrine of private nuisance and that it loses its effective-
ness in providing remedies in large scale hazardous waste
53. Wis. STAT. §§ 107.32-.35 (1981-82).
54. Wis. STAT. § 144.442 (1981-82).
55. Wis. STAT. § 144.443(10) (1981-82).
56. Wis. STAT. § 144.76(6) (1981-82).
57. Note, supra note 14, at 1720.
58. W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1, at 100 (1977).
59. Note, supra note 14, at 1720 & n.81.
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and pollution cases. 60 Nevertheless, a public nuisance,
which is the substantial and "unreasonable interference with
a right common to the general public," could also apply in
conjunction with private nuisance law to large scale hazard-
ous waste cases.61 In fact, public nuisance law would seem
to have more application in instances of major groundwater
contamination where the wastes adversely affect one or more
communities that rely on the affected aquifer.
Because nuisance theory appears to be the most fre-
quently used successful basis for liability in hazardous waste
litigation today, it deserves close scrutiny, particularly with
respect to its relationship to traditional rules of successorship
liability. This requires an understanding of the traditional
rule of corporate successor liability and of how successorship
liability law does not impose liability on a successor to prop-
erty for a predecessor's pre-transfer nuisance damages unless
there exists evidence of the assumption of such liability, a
merger with or continuation of the predecessor in title, or
fraud.
1. Liability of Owners of Land for Nuisance
It is appropriate to briefly consider the circumstances
which may result in the imposition of nuisance liability on
the owner of property. These circumstances are important
for they dictate whether the original liability of the predeces-
sor in title and of the successor in title will arise in the first
instance.
For the purpose of establishing liability, it is of no conse-
quence whether the previous or succeeding owner of a haz-
ardous waste site was a corporation or a natural person. It is
well established that both corporations and natural persons
are liable to the same degree for the creation or maintenance
of a nuisance by themselves or their agents.62 Therefore, al-
though most of the following discussion is set in the context
of corporate waste land acquisitions and corporate liability,
the general rules of law espoused below apply with equal
60. See, e.g., Comment, Hazardous Waste Liability and Compensation: Old Solu-
tions, New Solutions, No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 307, 321 (1982).
61. W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 2.2, at 102-07 (1977).
62. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 53 at 621 & n.13 (1971).
1984]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
weight to the situation wherein a private natural person
purchases waste land.
At common law, the owner of land had the primary obli-
gation to keep the premises from becoming a nuisance. This
duty and obligation arose out of the traditional legal maxim:
"So use your property as not to injure the rights of an-
other. ' 63 This rule has been interpreted to mean that an
owner or occupier of property must utilize land in a manner
that will not be a nuisance to other owners and occupiers of
property in the same community. Some decisions have
broadly held that whatever disturbs or annoys a landowner
in the free use, possession, or enjoyment of the property or
which makes its ordinary use or occupation physically un-
comfortable, may become a nuisance and may be re-
strained.64 Although this obligation and duty still exists, the
general rule now seems to be that a landowner is not liable,
merely because he or she holds the title to property, for the
consequences of a private nuisance upon it which the owner
did not create.65 In other words, "[o]ne who is not responsi-
ble for the creation of a private nuisance cannot be held lia-
ble for its subsequent maintenance merely because he has
become the owner of it."' 66 There are, however, a few excep-
tions to this rule.67
The question of liability for damage caused by the defec-
tive condition of property depends upon whether the defend-
ant was in control of the property, either through ownership
or possession, when the damage occured.6 s Control is the
crucial factor in determining liability and it is possible that
63. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bailes v. Guardian Realty Co., 237 Ala. 201, 206, 186
So. 168, 171 (1939).
64. See, e.g., Henderson v. Sullivan, 159 F. 46, 49 (6th Cir. 1908); Huddleston v.
Burnett, 172 Ark. 216, _, 287 S.W. 1013, 1013 (1926); Palm Corp. v. Walters, 148 Fla.
527, _, 4 So. 2d 696, 699 (1941); Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas-Light Co., 122 N.Y. 18,
25 N.E. 246, 247 (1890).
65. See, e.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. Mulens, 271 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1926); Tennes-
see Coal, Iron and R. Co. v. Hartline, 244 Ala. 116, _ 11 So. 2d 833, 838 (1943);
Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 741, _ 107 P.2d 501, 504
(1941); Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443,_.,
387 A.2d 142, 150 (1978).
66. Fuller v. Andrew, 230 Mass. 139, _, 119 N.E. 694, 696 (1918).
67. See infra notes 181-205 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Kurtigian v. City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, _ 203 N.E.2d 692,
693 (1965); Oxenrider v. Gvoic, 340 Mich. 591, -, 66 N.W.2d 80, 85 (1954).
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one might own land on which a nuisance occurs, but not be
liable because he or she did not have control of the property.
Although actions for nuisance and actions founded on
negligence have distinct elements, it is difficult at times to
distinguish between them.69 In either type of action there
must be a breach of a duty on the part of the defendant
before an action will le .70 The breach of duty in a nuisance
action against a landowner or another person may consist of
creating a dump and filling it with noxious substances which
contaminate the streams and nearby water.71 The fact of
land ownership by the defendant is of no real importance in
this context, since liability may also result from the commis-
sion of these same polluting acts by a lessee, licensee or tres-
passer. 2 The basis of liability in such cases flows from the
acts resulting in the creation or maintenance of the nuisance
and does not depend upon the ownership of the premises on
which it is located. 3
2. The Law of Nuisance in Wisconsin
Although a thorough discussion of the intricacies of Wis-
consin nuisance law is beyond the scope of this comment, a
few general points warrant mention.74 Nuisances in Wiscon-
sin may be either public or private in nature.75 A private
nuisance is an "unreasonable interference with the interests
of an individual in the use or enjoyment of land. ' 76 A public
nuisance in Wisconsin is generally described as conduct
which interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of life and
property by a considerable number of persons or an entire
69. Upp v. Darner, 150 Iowa 403, 407, 130 N.W. 409, 410 (1911).
70. Id.
71. Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961).
72. Id. at 216.
73. Tennesee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Hartline, 244 Ala. 116, _, 11 So. 2d 833, 839
(1943); Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961); Duncan v. Flagler, 192 Okla. 18, _ 132 P.2d 939, 940 (1942).
74. See generally P. Peshek, Ground Water Lawfor Wisconsin, Environmental
Law for the General Practitioner at 30-33 (Seminar Materials, State Bar of Wisconsin,
ATS-CLE Division) (July 1983); Wis. STAT. §§ 823.01-.22 (1981-82).
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B & 821D (1977) (defining
public and private nuisance).
76. Hoene v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 116 N.W.2d 112, 115
(1962).
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community. 77 However, a recent decision by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court requires a complex analysis involving six
factors to be considered for the finding of a public nui-
sance.78 It is also noteworthy that in Wisconsin a nuisance
may simultaneously be both public and private in character
since "[a] public nuisance which causes a particular injury to
an individual, different in kind and degree from that suffered
by the public constitutes a private nuisance. ' 79 An action to
recover damages from a nuisance and to abate a nuisance is
based on ownership of the affected property.80 One who
does not own property cannot bring a nuisance action
against another.
Two early hazardous waste cases in Wisconsin illustrate
how both a private and a municipal corporation in this state
may be held liable for engaging in acts which amount to a
nuisance. In each case the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
sidered the corporate entity to be no different than the pri-
vate citizen who engages in some form of polluting activity.
Price v. Oakfield Highland Creamery Co.8' illustrates this
principle in the context of an early Wisconsin industrial
waste nuisance case. In Price the supreme court enjoined a
creamery from causing offensive waste matter it produced to
percolate through the soil thereby entering the plaintiffs
well and destroying its usefulness. The waste also flowed
through the plaintiff's property causing injury to the soil and
pasture land.82 In finding for the plaintiff the court said: "If
a man chooses to put filth on his own land he must take care
not to let it escape onto his neighbor's land."83 The court
held that "[t]he defendant should be perpetually enjoined
from causing filth to flow upon the plaintiffs premises, either
77. State v. Quality Egg Farm, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 506, 515, 311 N.W.2d 650, 657
(1981). Cf. Hartung v. County of Milwaukee, 2 Wis. 2d 269, 284, 86 N.W.2d 475, 484
(1957).
78. State v. Quality Egg Farms, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 506, 520-21, 311 N.W.2d 650,
657-58 (1981). See also Wis. STAT. §§ 823.01-.02 (1981-82).
79. Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 414, 129 N.W.2d 217, 219
(1964).
80. Prochnow v. Northwestern Iron Co., 156 Wis. 408, 411, 145 N.W. 1098, 1099
(1914).
81. 87 Wis. 536, 58 N.W. 1039 (1894).
82. Id. at 540, 58 N.W. at 1040.
83. Id. at 542, 58 N.W. at 1041.
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directly, by percolation, or otherwise." 84
Winchell v. City of Waukesha 85 involved the waste pollu-
tion of a river by the city's sewage system. In Winchell the
supreme court stated that, like any other corporation, a mu-
nicipal corporation is no more exempt from the liability re-
sulting from its public or private nuisances than a private
individual. 6 Thus, it is clear that any corporation under
Wisconsin's nuisance law may be liable for the creation or
maintenance of a nuisance which "endangers life or health,
gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency, or
obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property. ' 87
III. WHO CAN BE SUED: ORIGINAL AND SUCCESSOR
TORT LIABILITY
A. The Traditional Rule of Successorship Liability
and its Exceptions
Commercial enterprises, and especially those involving
hazardous wastes, do not remain static in an environment of
expanding scientific knowledge, ecological controversy, and
adverse economic conditions. The ownership of such enter-
prises may change hands through the use of a number of
different devices.88 Depending upon the manner selected to
facilitate the transfer of ownership, the liability of the previ-
ous owner of the business for past torts may or may not pass
on to the succeeding owner.89
A well-settled traditional rule of corporate law90 holds
that a business organization receiving all or a substantial
part of the assets transferred from another entity, either
through a sale of the prior business or otherwise, is not liable
for the liabilities and debts of the transferor.91 In other
84. Id. at 543, 58 N.W. at 1041.
85. 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 (1901).
86. Id. at 110, 85 N.W. at 670-71.
87. Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry. Co., 199 Wis. 575, 588, 227 N.W. 385, 386
(1929) (Stevens, J., on reargument).
88. 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.06[1], at 70.58 (1983).
89. Id.
90. Id at § 5.06[2].
91. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 7122, at 188 & n.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1982). See also Fegan, Ten Rules/or Acquiring
Corporate Assets Without Successor Liability, 24 FOR THE DEFENSE, 10, 10 (1982).
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words, the buyer or successor company is not liable for the
seller's obligations and liabilities merely because of its suc-
cession in ownership of the previous company's property.
This general rule applies to tort liabilities as well as to
breach of contract cases.92
The four exceptions to this general rule are equally well
established. An express or implied agreement to assume an-
other company's debts or obligations will render a successor
company liable.93 So too will a finding that there was a
merger or consolidation of the previous and succeeding or-
ganizations. 94 A determination that "the purchasing com-
pany was a mere continuation of the selling company" will
also impose liability on the purchasing company. Finally,
if the asset transfer is entered into fraudulently in order to
allow the selling corporation to escape liability for its debts
and obligations, the purchasing corporation will likewise
have liability imposed upon it.96
The traditional rule regarding nonliability of a successor
corporation after a transfer of purchased assets and its four
exceptions were succinctly stated in McKee v. Harris-Sey-
bold Co. 97
It is the general rule that where one company sells or
otherwise transfers all its assets to another company the lat-
ter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the trans-
feror, including those arising out of the latter's tortious
conduct, except where: (1) the purchaser expressly or im-
pliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2) the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller and pur-
chaser; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continu-
ation of the selling corporation, or (4) the transaction is
entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for
such debts. . . . A fifth exception, sometimes incorporated
as an element of one of the above exceptions, is the absence
of adequate consideration for the sale or transfer.98
92. W. FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 7123 at 202, 203 n.l.
93. Id. § 7122 at 189, 194-95 nn.7-8.
94. Id. at 196-98 n.9.
95. Id. at 198-200 n.11.
96. Id. at 198 n.10.
97. 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970).
98. Id. at 561, 264 A.2d at 101-02.
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The traditional rule of corporate successor liability with
its exceptions and the law of nuisance liability are in-
separably linked in any discussion of hazardous waste suc-
cessor liability because nuisance theory is the primary basis
for a finding of any hazardous waste tort liability. These two
distinct areas of corporate and tort law interface at the point
where questions of liability for past, present and future
abatement and damages are to be decided. As the next sev-
eral sections will explain, while the adoption and continu-
ance of a nuisance will establish the liability of the party in
control of the property for post-transfer nuisance damages,
the applicability of one or more of these four exceptions to
the traditional doctrine of corporate successor liability may
additionally render that party liable for the pre-transfer
damages of the predecessor's nuisance as well. These earlier
damages for which the successor gains liability may even
predate the successor's very existence.
B. Nuisance Liabilityfor Transferors of Land and
Successors in Title
A significant number of nuisance cases across the coun-
try have dealt with successive ownership liability. Thus, a
meaningful guide to the resolution of the questions concern-
ing successor liability in hazardous waste cases lies in the
wealth of case law concerning common-law nuisances. 99
The following analysis surveys the law on this topic across
the United States. Specific attention is then directed to Wis-
consin's treatment of these general rules.
When the creator of a nuisance parts with the property
on which the nuisance exists he or she does not necessarily
also part with the liability for the post-sale damages from the
nuisance.100 The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the
general rule that a vendor of land is liable, under negligence
or nuisance theory, to those injured from an artificial condi-
tion created or allowed to remain on the land, just until the
99. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances §§ 48-60 (1971 & Supp. 1983); 66
C.J.S. Nuisances § 88 (1950 & Supp. 1983).
100. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Mullens, 271 U.S. 220,227 (1926); Cumberland Teleph.
& Teleg. Co., Inc. v. Lawrence, 271 F. 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1921); State ex re. Bailes v.
Guardian Realty Co., 237 Ala. 201, __ 186 So. 168, 172-73 (1939); Henriques v.
Rockefeller, 148 Conn. 654, _ 173 A.2d 596, 598 (1961).
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transferee's liability becomes fixed.' 10 This fixing of the
transferee's liability occurs when the purchaser receives no-
tice to abate the nuisance, 1 2 or has had a reasonable oppor-
tunity through prompt inspection to discover the nuisance
and remedy it. 0 3 The creator of a nuisance may still be held
liable for the abatement of a hazardous waste site at least for
a reasonable period after transfer of the land, regardless of
the liability of subsequent owners.1°4 The court in Sarnican-
dro v. Lake Developers, Inc.0 5 explained this result as
follows:
[Where the vendor creates a situation which interferes
with the rights of the public or with the use or enjoyment of
adjoining lands. . . (and) where the land is transferred in
such a condition that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to those outside the premises, the vendor has been
held liable on the theory of a public or a private nuisance,
at least for a reasonable length of time after he has parted
with possession. 06
However, according to at least one commentator, courts
are reluctant to impose liability even after a reasonable time
on current, nonpolluting owners because of the great costs
associated with abating the problems created by the leakage
of chemicals from underground dump sites. 10 7 The prevail-
ing approach now appears to be that courts will primarily
consider factors other than ownership in determining who
should bear liability for the contamination.108 In actions in-
volving private litigants, this trend would allow a succeeding
landowner to be relieved of liability if he or she did not
know of the earlier waste disposal on the land. 0 9 It is even
possible that the vendor's nondisclosure of these conditions
may create a cause of action against the vendor himself."0
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 366, 373 (1965) and §§ 839, 840A
(1977), analyzed in 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 32.
102. See, e.g., Pillsbury v. Moore, 44 Me. 154, 157 (1857); Brown v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry. Co., 268 S.W. 678, 680 (Mo. 1925).
103. See, e.g., Pharm v. Lituchy, 283 N.Y. 130, 132, 27 N.E.2d 811, 812 (1940).
104. Mott, supra note 6, at 415 & n.225.
105. 55 N.J. Super. 475, 151 A.2d 48 (1959).
106. 1d at 481, 151 A.2d at 51.
107. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 2, at 86.
108. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 32.
109. Id
110. Mott, supra note 6, at 414.
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However, sometimes a failure to take reasonable steps to
abate a known nuisance may render an otherwise innocent
purchaser liable for the nuisance."' Knowledge of the nui-
sance may be inferred from the reduced price paid for the
property which reflects the impaired condition of the land.12
There are a number of recent cases in which courts have
imposed liability on previous landowners and waste genera-
tors who were responsible for harmful waste disposal on
their land. 13 In these cases a government entity served as
the plaintiff in either an enforcement action or civil action
for the recovery of cleanup costs. 1 4 It was generally held
that the liability of subsequent landowners is limited unless
they had accepted or associated themselves with the creation
or maintenance of the harmful conditions on the property."lI
Thus, one who actively continues a nuisance is just as liable
as the party who first created it' 16 and all who participate in
the creation or maintenance of the nuisance are liable to
third persons for injuries resulting from it." 7
I 11. Id. at 414 & n.223.
112. Id. at 414-15 & n.224.
113. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 32-33 (citing Appendix C, id, Part 2,
at 84-95, which discusses the following cases: Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d 39, 371
N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (The New York Supreme Court allowed a cause of action
against the former owner of land who had negligently created a dangerous condition
on his land and then sold the land. The court's holding was based on two principles:
(1) a person who creates an inherently dangerous condition upon real property bears
the same responsibility for any injuries or damage resulting therefrom as would the
manufacturer of an inherently dangerous or defective chattel, and (2) legal responsi-
bility under these circumstances does not depend upon ownership or possession of the
property either at the time the act of negligence or the injury occurs.); Department of
Environ. Pro. v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977) (The former
owner's affirmative actions were considered more important than the mere ownership
of the land where the former owner was found liable, even after he transferred the
land, for creating a nuisance by dumping oil onto adjoining property.); New Jersey v.
Ventron, No. C-2996-75 (Super. Ct., Ch. Div. Bergen Co., Aug. 27, 1979), a f'd, modi-
fled and remanded, 182 N.J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 1981) (The court found three suc-
cessive owners of a mercury processing plant jointly and severally liable for past leaks
that contaminated groundwater while a fourth nonpolluting party presently owned
the plant)).
114. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part I at 32.
115. Id. at 33.
116. Rush v. Concrete Materials & Const. Co., 172 Kan. 70,_ 238 P.2d 704, 707
(1951); Fuller v. Andrew, 230 Mass. 139, _, 119 N.E. 694, 696 (1918).
117. Rush v. Concrete Materials & Const. Co., 172 Kan. 70, _..., 238 P.2d 704,707
(1951); Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, _ 122 A.2d 475, 478, 480 (1956).
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Another basis for the liability of a new owner of land is
that he or she permitted or authorized the creation of a nui-
sance by some person for whose action he or she is responsi-
ble." 8 Such responsibility commonly arises in the context of
a principal-agent relationship.
Other cases hold that where the transferee enters into a
covenant with the transferor to continue a nuisance condi-
tion for the transferor's benefit, the transferor's liability is
likewise certain. 19 However, when a creator of a nuisance
transfers control of the land in such a way that there is no
inference that the transferor authorized or profited from the
continuance of the nuisance, his or her responsibility for it
may cease.120
Most jurisdictions hold that one does not continue a nui-
sance erected by another simply by failing to abate or re-
move it.121 Thus, active participation in the continuance of
the nuisance or evidence of its adoption from some positive
act is required for liability to attach. 22 If affirmative con-
duct of the defendant is necessary for the continuance, and
no statute exists that expressly provides for recovery,123
many plaintiffs in hazardous waste cases will be unable to
recover against current landowners. At least eight states
have enacted statutes which impose liability upon a subse-
quent landowner. 24  California's provision contains lan-
guage typical of this kind of legislation: 125 "Every successive
owner of property who neglects to abate a continuing nui-
sance upon, or in the use of such property, caused by a for-
mer owner, is liable therefore in the same manner as the one
who first created it.' u12 6
118. City of Phoenix v. Harlan, 75 Ariz. 290, _, 255 P.2d 609, 612-13 (1953);
Montgomery v. Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit, 306 Ky. 275, - 207 S.W.2d 27, 28-
29 (1947); Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443,
- 387 A.2d 142, 150 (1978).
119. Keeley v. Manor Park Apts., Sec. 1, 99 A.2d 248, 250 (Del. 1953).
120. Id. at 251.
121. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 373 (1963-64).
122. Adams v. Baltimore Transit Co., 203 Md. 295, , 100 A.2d 781, 787 (1953).
See generally Roughton v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 209 Ga. 577, _ 74 S.E.2d 844, 847
(1953);
123. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 33.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3483 (West 1970).
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The courts have generally interpreted these statutes as
imposing liability upon the current landowner even if he or
she did not create the nuisuance or contribute to it. 27 How-
ever, early cases dealing with these statutes frequently re-
quired that the successive owner had both notice of the
condition upon the land and had "failed to abate the nui-
sance in response to a specific request."' 128
The most troublesome question concerning the fixing of
the purchaser's liability appears to be whether or not an in-
jured party must give the purchaser notice that the nuisance
exists and demand its abatement. 29 Some courts hold that
in the absence of prior notice or a request by the injured
party that a nuisance be abated, a grantee is not liable for
allowing a nuisance to remain or continue. 30 Others have
criticized this rule3 1 and have insisted that notice is unneces-
sary provided that the purchaser has actual knowledge of the
injury resulting from the nuisance. 32 Recent case law may
limit the liability of a subsequent landowner even after there
was notice where there existed no statute imposing such
liability. 33
C. Wisconsin's Treatment of the Successorship Doctrine
There are a number of early nuisance cases in Wisconsin
that established and developed the law of successorship lia-
bility and the law pertaining to. liability for hazardous waste
127. 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 33.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., City of Valparaiso v. Bozarth, 153 Ind. 536, 538-39, 55 N.E. 439,
439-40 (1899).
130. See, e.g., Philadelphia & R.R. Co. v. Smith, 64 F. 679, 682 (3d Cir. 1894);
Roberts v. Georgia Ry. & Power Co., 151 Ga. 241, _ 106 S.E. 258, 261 (1921); Groff
v. Ankenbrandt, 124 IlL. 51, 55-56, 15 N.E. 40, 42 (1888); Bishop v. Readsboro Chair
Mfg. Co., 85 Vt. 141,.._, 81 A. 454, 458 (1911).
131. Caldwell v. Gale, 11 Mich. 77, 78 (1862).
132. See, e.g., Sloss Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Nance, 216 Ala. 237, , 113 So.
50, 52 (1927); Willitts v. Chicago, B. & K. C. Ry. Co., 88 Iowa 281, _ 55 N.W. 313,
316 (1893); Martin v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 81 Kan. 344, _ 105 P. 451, 452
(1909).
133. 30 1(e) Report, supra note 18, Part 1, at 34. See Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978), afJT'd sub nom.,
National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37, appeal
dismissed, 449 U.S. 803 (1980) (illustrating the trend toward limiting the liability of
successor landowners).
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contamination. A few of these cases confront both issues.
The cases presented below illustrate how the Wisconsin
courts have treated these two issues over the years. The
older cases will be considered first. They will be followed by
a comparison between the successorship rule as employed in
early hazardous waste contamination cases and a recent de-
cision which expanded the successorship liability rule in
Wisconsin to its present form.
An early water pollution case, Greene v. Nunnemacher,134
established some of the fundamental principles of successor-
ship liability for nuisance actions in Wisconsin. The plain-
tiff, who owned land along a river, alleged that the
defendant's distillery, stable and hog farm, located about a
mile and half upstream, corrupted and putrilied the river
flowing through his land and penetrated the banks of the
river causing great injury to all in the vicinity and especially
to the plaintiff and his family. 35 The polluting distillery and
farm were owned by Jacob Nunnemacher, but three other
tenants successively resided on the property and maintained
these two operations. 136 Since Jacob was the owner of the
property including the distillery and farm, the court deter-
mined that he was liable for having created and maintained
the nuisance which contaminated the river and the plaintiff's
land. The court also considered the liability of the non-
owner tenants who at different times operated the polluting
distillery and farm. The court found that these tenants were
also liable for maintaining the nuisance during their respec-
tive tenancies but said that it was clear that a tenant cannot
be held liable for damages sustained before and after the pe-
riod of the tenancy. 137 As a result, the court ruled that each
tenant should not be held liable for damages caused by the
owner, Jacob, before the commencement of their term, nor
should they be held liable for the nuisances caused by other
tenants in which they were not connected. 38
A question which arises is whether Jacob's liability
would have ceased upon his sale of the property. Certainly
134. 36 Wis. 50 (1874).
135. Id. at 56.
136. Id. at 52.
137. Id. at 58.
138. Id at 59.
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businesses involved in hazardous waste dumping on their
own property would be inclined to avoid potential liability
for waste damages by transferring the property if their re-
sponsibility for the land could be severed in that way. This
question was answered in the case of Lohmiller v. The Indian
Ford Water-Power Co.'39 In Lohmiller the court held that an
owner of property containing a nuisance who conveyed it
"with covenants of warranty"1 40 is regarded as maintaining
this nuisance by the covenants just as one who rents out
property with a nuisance is regarded as maintaining the nui-
sance by receiving rent for the property.14 1 In either case the
former owner or lessor will be liable.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has considered more nui-
sance cases involving transferee liability than transferor lia-
bility. The well-settled general rule in Wisconsin transferee
cases is that in an action for damages resulting from the
erection or continuance of a nuisance, it is sufficient to show
that the injury was either caused by the authority of the de-
fendants or that they continued it after acquiring title to the
land. 42 Likewise, in Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry.
Co., 143 the court stated that one who maintains a nuisance
created by another is just as liable for the injuries sustained
from it "as if he had himself created the danger in the first
place."'144 This liability of an owner or occupier of the land
containing a nuisance results not because of ownership or
occupancy, but because of the failure to abate the
nuisance. 145
Another early case, Slight v. Gutzlaff14 6 established the
rule in Wisconsin that a lessee or grantee who continues a
nuisance erected by the lessor or grantor must first be given
notice to reform or abate the nuisance before he or she may
be found liable for its abatement and damages. 47 The court
139. 51 Wis. 683, 8 N.W. 587 (1881).
140. Id at 689, 8 N.W. at 588.
141. Id.
142. Cobb v. Smith, 38 Wis. 21, 33 (1875).
143. 199 Wis. 575, 224 N.W. 748, aj'd on rehearing, 227 N.W. 385 (1929).
144. Id. at 590, 227 N.W. at 386.
145. Id.
146. 35 Wis. 675 (1874).
147. Id. at 677.
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explained that such a rule is just and reasonable in that it did
no wrong to the party injured while it protected "the lessee
or grantee from surprise and hardship."'
4 8
As more is learned about the hazards of toxic industrial
wastes, there can be no doubt businesses will seek to dramat-
ically reduce or completely halt their waste dumping activity
in the hope that this will save them from exposure to hazard-
ous waste damage claims. While such a course may reduce a
disposer's potential liability arising from present and future
dumping, it will not affect that party's possible liability for
past waste dumping under nuisance law. Should the dis-
poser cease the waste dumping activity which contributed to
a nuisance prior to the commencement of a nuisance action,
he or she would not escape liability for existing damages.
This rule was stated in Kamke v. Clark,I49 a case which in-
volved the dumping of the defendant brewery's garbage and
other putrid refuse material on the property of another de-
fendant who owned the dumpsite.' 50 Even though the brew-
ery had stopped its dumping activities prior to the
commencement of the plaintiff's suit, the court held that its
acts contributed to produce a nuisance which continued to
exist as of the date the plaintiff began his suit. 15
1
In most cases, the contamination of land and ground-
water by hazardous waste presents a problem that will per-
sist for a substantial period of time. The potential for harm
to a party injured by the waste may include injury from the
past, present and future effects of the contaminants. The fu-
ture injuries may be extensive and could exist for many
years. The Wisconsin courts initially refused to grant recov-
ery for future damages in nuisance cases, but later modified
that ruling. Stadler v. Grieben 52, a stockyard odor and noise
nuisance case, illustrates the original position of the courts
which required subsequent actions for the recovery of these
damages as they accrued.
148. Id
149. 268 Wis. 465, 478, 67 N.W.2d 841, 847 (1955).
150. Id. at 466-67, 67 N.W.2d at 842.
151. Id at 478, 67 N.W.2d at 847.
152. 61 Wis. 500, 21 N.W. 629 (1884).
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In Stadler the court held that once a suit was com-
menced, the plaintiff could only recover for damages that
had accrued up to that point. The court explained that be-
cause every continuance of a nuisance is, under the law, a
new nuisance, a continuance of the nuisance after the time of
the verdict is a new cause of action. Therefore the damages
that accrue after the verdict must be recovered in a subse-
quent action. 53
However, the court reversed this position in the indus-
trial waste contamination case of Anstee v. Monroe Light &
Fuel Co.15 4 In Anstee the supreme court found that the lower
court had properly assessed damages for future as well as
past injury to the soil and well of the plaintiff harmed by the
defendant's refuse. The injury was caused by the percola-
tion through the plaintiffs soil of large quantities of oily in-
dustrial waste. This waste was deposited by the defendant in
a section of an abandoned sewer on the plaintiffs prem-
ises. 55 The court based its decision regarding damages on
the fact that no further recurrence of the nuisance was likely
and that this assessment of damages was the only way the
plaintiff could be made whole in one action for the losses he
experienced through the nuisance committed by the defend-
ant. 56 Thus it appears that Anstee presents a withdrawal
from the harsh rule of Stadler, allowing past and future
damages to be recoverable when the continuance of the nui-
sance or a new cause of action is unlikely. The court in An-
stee also seemed to give weight to the savings which may be
derived through the resolution of the damages issue in one
action.
The traditional rule of successor liability would hold a
transferee of the transferor's assets liable for the latter's tor-
tious conduct only if. (1) the purchaser agrees to assume the
obligation; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the purchasing corpo-
ration is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or
(4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to
153. Id. at 505, 21 N.W. at 632. But cf. Karns v. Allen, 135 Wis. 48, 59, 115 N.W.
357, 361 (1908).
154. 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920).
155. Id. at 292, 177 N.W. at 26.
156. Id at 294, 177 N.W. at 27.
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escape liability for such debts. 57 A transferee will always be
liable for those damages resulting from post-transfer contin-
uance of a nuisance already created. But only through the
application of one of these four exceptions can liability be
established for the pre-transfer damages resulting from the
predecessor's maintenance of a nuisance.
In early Wisconsin successor liability cases, only the first
of these exceptions to the general rule was considered by the
courts. The courts appeared to look only for the express as-
sumption of a predecessor's liability.
An early Wisconsin nuisance case which illustrates this
point is Karns v. Allen.'15 This case involved two defendants,
Nathan and Charles W. Allen who, acting as co-partners,
constructed a dam across a creek. Three years later the
property and the dam were sold by these defendant co-part-
ners to the corporate defendant N.R. Allen's Sons Company,
a company in which the co-partners served as president and
vice president. The plaintiffs lived across the creek near the
dam and brought a nuisance action for abatement, damages
and general relief due to the flooding of their property and
obstruction of the creek due to the dam.'5 9 After the sale of
the property and dam to the corporation, the company re-
mained in possession of the land and maintained the dam as
the co-partners had previously. In considering the corpora-
tion's liability for the nuisance of the predecessors in title,
the supreme court stated:
The dam having been constructed and maintained by the
defendants Nathan and Charles W. Allen up to the time of
the sale to the defendant corporation, and there being no
proof of assumption of liability by defendant corporation, we
find nothing in the record which wouldjustfy a judgment for
damages against the corporation accruing in consequence of
such nuisance before the sale.' 60
However, the court recognized that after the sale the original
defendants, now acting as officers of the purchasing corpora-
tion, maintained the dam in substantially the same manner
157. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
158. 135 Wis. 48, 115 N.W. 357 (1908).
159. Id. at 49-50, 115 N.W. at 358.
160. Id. at 55, 115 N.W. at 360 (emphasis added).
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as they had before the sale. 16 1 Thus, the court found that the
two individual defendants were personally liable for the en-
tire unapportioned nuisance damages, assessed from the
time of the construction of the dam to the time of the trial. 62
Furthermore, the court found that the judgment for abate-
ment was properly awarded against all the defendants in-
cluding the individual officers and the defendant
corporation. 163
The Karns case illustrates that successor liability law in
Wisconsin as of 1908 had not developed to the point at
which the remaining three exceptions to the general rule cur-
rently recognized were acknowledged by the court. 64 It ap-
pears likely that by the current standards, the transaction
between the defendant co-partners, Nathan and Charles Al-
len, and the defendant corporation with Nathan and Charles
as the two principal officers, might be considered to fit into
any one of the three additional exceptions. For example,
this transaction could be construed as either a consolidation
or merger of the seller and purchaser, a manifestation of the
mere continuation of the selling business entity or, at least a
fraudulent transaction entered into in order to escape liabil-
ity for the co-partners' debts or nuisance damages. Had the
court considered Karns under today's four complete excep-
tions to the successor liability rule, it is probable that the
defendant corporation would not have escaped liability for
the nuisance damages.
The Karns case is an example of how a court must con-
sider both the rules of nuisance liability and the traditional
corporate law doctrine of successor liability. Additionally, it
represents an early stage in the development of the tradi-
tional successor liability rule. Gradually all four exceptions
to the general rule of successor nonliability have been recog-
nized by courts throughout the country.
Federal courts accepted the traditional rule and its four
161. Id
162. Id. at 59, 115 N.W. at 361.
163. Id
164. But cf infra note 171 and accompanying text.
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exceptions in several cases which arose in Wisconsin. 165 Al-
though these decisions assumed that the traditional rule was
followed in Wisconsin state courts, no Wisconsin Supreme
Court cases existed to support this assumption. 166 It was not
until the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision in Tft v. For-
age King Industries, Inc. 67 that all four exceptions to the
traditional rule of corporate successor liability were ex-
pressly adopted in Wisconsin. In 7#?, a decision arising out
of a products liability action, the court of appeals followed
the lead of federal and state courts across the country which
have adopted the rule, but admitted that the extent of the
applicability of some of these exceptions was questionable
because the Wisconsin Supreme Court had not yet ruled on
the issue. 168
The Wisconsin Supreme Court received the opportunity
to do so when it heard the same case on appeal in 1982.169
The court noted that the trial court in T7ft had relied on the
traditional successorship rule as set forth in the federal court
decision from the Seventh Circuit in Leannais v. Cincinnati;
Inc. 17
0
In T!ft the Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted the gen-
eral rule with its four exceptions, and expanded its applica-
bility by stating:
We hold as a matter of law that the rule and its exceptions
are applicable, irrespective of whether a prior organization
was a corporation or a different form of business
organization.
It should be emphasized that the corporate rule that ex-
empts a successor company from the liabilities of its prede-
cessor when it has purchased the assets of the predecessor
is subject to the four exceptions recited in Leannais...
165. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977); Forest
Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 1971); Bazan v. Kux
Machine Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
166. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1977) (Chief
Justice Fairchild, dissenting in part, recognized that there were as of that time no
decisions by the Wisconsin courts applying the successorship rules of federal cases).
167. 102 Wis. 2d 327, 306 N.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1981).
168. Id. at 330 & n.4, 306 N.W.2d at 290-91 & 291 n.4.
169. Tift v. Forage King Industries, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982).
170. 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) (cited in Tift v. Forage King Industries,
Inc., 108 Wis. 2d at 75-76, 322 N.W.2d at 15).
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and considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals. 171
This language represents an expansion of the applicability of
the general rule as it was adopted by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals. Both the trial court and the court of appeals found
the general rule and its exceptions not applicable in T7ft be-
cause the predecessor was a sole proprietorship. Therefore
the court of appeals ruled that the successor entity "could
not be a successor corporation to the original manufacturer,
because the original manufacturer was not a corporation."'172
However, the supreme court concluded "that the responsibil-
ity of a subsequent business organization, irrespective of the
nature of either the predecessor or successor, proprietorship,
partnership, or corporation, cannot be facilely dismissed on
the basis of the semantics of the rule."' 7 3
The court also emphasized how, in a products liability
case like TPfi, the "fixing of liability on the subsequent man-
ufacturer of the product line does not necessarily exonerate
the prior manufacturer of the defective product."' 74 The
court stated that the present business organization may have
the right of indemnity against the prior manufacturer.17 TOt
stressed that a plaintiff may seek recourse against either the
current or previous manufacturer of the defective product. 176
Because Tfit was a products liability case and not a hazard-
ous waste contamination case, it is not certain that the pre-
cise holdings in Tff will apply in all future toxic tort cases.
But it appears likely that the court's general use of the term
"liabilities"' 177 in its adoption of the general rule includes lia-
bilities in cases involving successive ownership of contami-
nated real property and injured neighbors of the property.
However, it is often difficult or impossible to either locate
the predecessor in title or sue the bankrupt or dissolved
corporation.
Thus, the plaintiff seeking compensation in a hazardous
waste case may have no choice but to sue only the transferee
171. 108 Wis. 2d at 77-78, 322 N.W.2d at 16 (footnote omitted).
172. Id. at 76, 322 N.W.2d at 16 (emphasis in original).
173. Id
174. Id at 80, 322 N.W.2d at 17.
175. Id.
176. Id
177. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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of the contaminated property. This transferee would be
found liable for the pre-transfer nuisances of its predecessor
in title if any one of the four exceptions adopted in T#f?
would apply. In addition, the transferee would gain liability
for the post-sale nuisance damages through the adoption and
continuance of the predecessor's nuisance.
IV. STATUTORY THEORIES APPLIED TO HAZARDOUS
WASTE LIABILITY
Unfortunately, to date there are few decisions on the is-
sue of successorship liability in hazardous waste cases.
However, these few cases, and also several secondary
sources, 17 discuss this matter in some detail. While the law
still appears to be unsettled in this area, these opinions may
foreshadow the future direction of the courts.
A. Modification of the Common Law by Federal Statutes
In keeping with the early common law,179 the rule today
is that mere ownership of a hazardous waste dump site,
without notice and continuation of the nuisance, is not suffi-
cient to establish liability for post-purchase environmental
damage.1 80 However, as with all common-law rules, this
traditional successorship doctrine may be superseded by
controlling legislation. There are two federal acts which
some courts have relied upon to avoid the effects of the
traditional corporate successorship and nuisance rules. They
are the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980 ("Superfund") 18I and the
178. See generally Mott, supra note 6; Practicing Law Institute, HAZARDOUS
WASTE LITIGATION (1982) [hereinafter cited as HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION].
See also 301(e) Report, supra note 18, Parts 1 & 2.
179. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
180. Mott, supra note 6, at 414 & n.220 (citing, as a good example of traditional
successorship case law, Department of Environ. Pro. v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super.
464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977), as well as Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Hortiline (sic),
244 Ala. 116, _, 11 So. 2d 833, 837-38 (1943); Glenn v. Crescent Coal Co., 145 Ky.
137,_...., 140 S.W. 43,44 (1911); Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth,
35 Pa. Commw. 443, 387 A.2d 142 (1978), aff'dsub nom., National Wood Preservers,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 489 Pa. 221, 414 A.2d 37 (1980); Commonwealth v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 12 Pa. Commw. 227, 315 A.2d 648, 654-55 (1974)).
181. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980).
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).18 2
When interpreting these Acts to impose liability on waste
site owners, courts place more emphasis on the public policy
implications of their decisions than on the great weight of
common-law authority which may demand a contrary result.
While the common law in most cases would hold an inno-
cent purchaser of a dump site nuisance free from liability
where there was no active continuance or positive adoption
of the nuisance by the innocent purchaser, these statutes
have been interpreted by the courts to impose liability in
such cases.
One example of how the RCRA's section 7003183 has
been used to accomplish the circumvention of the common-
law successorship rule is provided in United States v.
Price.8 4 The defendants in this case included the purchasers
of property several years after waste dumping on the
purchased land had ceased. After being named as defend-
ants by the government in a section 7003 hazardous waste
abatement claim, these defendants filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that they were not liable
under the statute.18 5 The defendants argued that they were
never actively involved in the dumping on the property and
that they did not know that chemical wastes had been
dumped there until several years after the dumping had
ceased.86 In denying the summary judgment motion, the
court noted that the waste "disposal" which triggers section
7003 of the Act need not be active' 87 in the sense of recent
intentional dumping. Rather, the court said that those who
purchase hazardous waste property and fail to rectify the
condition contribute passively to the waste disposal, 88
"merely by virtue of their studied indifference to the hazard-
ous condition that now exists."' 89 The Price court inter-
preted section 7003 as having an extremely broad statutory
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
184. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), affda 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982).
185. 523 F. Supp. at 1069.
186. Id. at 1070.
187. Id. at 1073.
188. A passive contribution may occur through the leaking of the wastes from a
source of pollution.
189. 523 F. Supp. at 1073.
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definition of "disposal" intended to encompass both the pas-
sive leaking of contaminants from a landfill as well as the
active dumping of contaminants on a landfill.190 The court
also cited United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp.'91 as sup-
porting the proposition that ownership imposes responsibil-
ity for hazardous conditions on one's land. 92 The rationale
for the Price court's imposition of liabilty on these "inno-
cent" purchasers was stated as follows:
Admittedly, the [Partnership] defendants did not create
that hazardous condition. Nonetheless, they were aware,
at the time they purchased the property, that it had been
used as a landfil. As sophisticated investors, they had a
duty to investigate the actual conditions that existed on the
property or take it as it was. They deliberately chose the
latter course. Moreover, they became aware in the summer
of 1979 that toxic chemicals had been dumped at the land-
fill, but they have done nothing to abate the hazardous
condition that exists. Under these circumstances, the [Part-
nership] defendants may be held responsible to stop the
continued leaking of contaminants from the site.' 93
The court relied on the legislative history of the act in its
determination that Congress intended the "contributing to"
disposal phrase of section 7003 to be interpreted broadly.
The legislative intent was the basis for the court's departure
from the principle established in some jurisdictions that one
does not continue a nuisance erected by another simply by
failing to abate or remove it.' 94 However, the court did cite
section 3004(b) 195 as a limitation on a subsequent owner's
190. Id. at 1073-74. See also Mott, supra note 6, at 408.
191. 489 F. Supp. 870, 877 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
192. Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1073.
193. Id
194. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Mid-
west Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 144 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (cited with ap-
proval in United States v. Solvents Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp.
1127, 1133 (D. Conn. 1980)).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 6934(b) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
(b) Previous owners and operators In the case of any facility or site not in
operation at the time a determination is made under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion with respect to the facility or site, if the Administrator finds that the owner
of such facility or site could not reasonably be expected to have actual knowl-
edge of the presence of hazardous waste at such facility or site and of its poten-
tial for release, he may issue an order requiring the most recent previous owner
or operator of such facility or site who could reasonably be expected to have
[Vol. 67:691
HAZARDOUS WASTE
liability where the owner "could not reasonably be expected
to have actual knowledge of the presence of hazardous waste
at such facility and of its potential for release."1 96
Similarly, United States v. Waste Industries97 involved
"innocent" owners of a disposal site who leased it for use as
a government-approved landfilL Their property was then
returned to them in a contaminated condition which
amounted to a nuisance. In contrast to the theory followed
in early Wisconsin law,198 the court found that the owners
were not liable for the tenant's use and nuisance during the
term of the lease.199 However, the owners were considered
by the court to be liable as current owners and occupiers of
the property with a continuing nuisance once they had
regained the exclusive right to use the property after it re-
verted back to them.200 Thus, just by the mere ownership of
a property containing a dump site nuisance, the defendants
were liable for the nuisance.
A different result was reached in New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.,201 which in-
volved the purchase by innocent parties of property contam-
inated by hazardous mercury wastes. The purchasers
constructed a containment system to prevent contaminants
from being discharged or leaked from the site. The trial
court credited the mitigation action taken by the purchasers
as resulting in the prevention of groundwater contamination
from the mercury. While the appellate court found that a
statutory and common-law nuisance existed, it said the over-
all dangerous and toxic condition of the site was not proxi-
mately caused in any substantial way by the purchasers. 02
Thus, unlike the Price and Waste Industries defendants, the
such actual knowledge to carry out the actions referred to in subsection (a) of
this section.
196. Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1074.
197. 556 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (analyzed in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITI-
GATION, supra note 178, at 36).
198. Cf. supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
199. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1318-19. See also HAZARDOUS WASTE
LITIGATION, supra note 178, at 36.
200. HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION, supra note 178, at 36.
201. 182 N.J. Super. 210, 440 A.2d 455 (1981), modpiedandaff'd, 94 N.J. 254,463
A.2d 893 (1983).
202. 182 N.J. Super. at _, 440 A.2d at 463, a ff' 94 N.J. at _, 463 A.2d at 903.
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purchasers in Ventron eliminated any prospective contribu-
tion by them to the hazard by acting to abate the discharges
from the time they gained title to the property.2 °3
"Superfund" represents another major exception to the
general common-law rule of nonliability for mere owner-
ship. The specific language of section 107,24 which directly
provides for the liability of an owner of a dump site "facil-
ity" 20 5 regardless of responsibility for the contamination, is
completely contrary to traditional rules. This inconsistency
probably results from a view that public policy values the
imposition of liability upon an identifiable, though arguably
innocent, owner more than a finding of owner nonliability
which might leave no deep pocket to compensate an injured
party. Because the traditional rule would hold in some cases
203. See 182 N.J. Super. at _, 440 A.2d at 459. See also HAZARDOUS WASTE
LITIGATION, supra note 178, at 37-38.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (Supp. IV 1980) provides:
"[F]acility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment,
pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where
a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel.
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that the only possible defendant is not liable for damages
and thus the injured party is left without any relief, the
Superfund approach to "mere ownership" liability was a
practical solution to the problem. Such a practical law suit
under Superfund could then be used to impose liability on
an innocent purchaser of waste property who had absolutely
no idea that there was any hazardous waste deposited on the
property. Although there are few reported cases to date im-
plementing this section 107 of the Act, it may be expected
that in the future more plaintiffs will rely on this approach to
avoid the common-law successorship rules that may possibly
deny them a judgment against the only possible defendant
- the innocent owner of the property.
B. Modiflcation of the Common Law by State Statutes
While it is said that almost every state has adopted some
kind of scheme to regulate hazardous wastes, all aspects of
liability are treated completely in only a few states.20 6 Min-
nesota recently has become one of these few with the enact-
ment of its own environmental response and liability act. In
contrast with the federal Superfund Act (CERCLA), Minne-
sota's new statute (MERLA)20 7 contains major differences
with regard to persons liable for the cleanup of the hazard-
ous wastes and for compensable damages. Generally, under
Minnesota's statute "a person is responsible for a release or
the threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants or
contaminants from a facility provided the person is a genera-
tor, transporter, owner or operator of the facility. ' ' 208 CER-
CLA places liability only on those who owned or operated
the facility during the time of either the original disposal or
the subsequent waste release, thereby ignoring owners dur-
ing the intervening period between these two points. How-
ever, this liability gap for interim owners is* eliminated by
MERLA's definition of responsible persons as all those who
owned the facility whenever the hazardous substance "was
206. See Espel, supra note 49, at 407.
207. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.01-.24 (West Supp. 1984). See generally Espel,
supra note 49, at 407.
208. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.03 (West Supp. 1984).
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located in or on the facility. ' 209 Nevertheless, the liability of
all landowners under MERLA may be limited by an "inno-
cent landowner ' 210 exclusion which is missing from CER-
CLA. MERLA provides liability for the landowner only if
he or she engages in five specific kinds of conduct.21' In this
way MERLA's innocent-landowner exclusion makes the
statute similar to the common law of nuisance. By common
law the landowner would be liable if he or she created the
nuisance or allowed its creation, and a buyer of land with an
existing nuisance would be liable only if he or she continued
the nuisance and took some positive act demonstrating an
adoption of the existing conditions. 1
Also, unlike CERCLA, MERLA directly addresses lia-
bility for personal injury and economic loss 21 3 by providing
that any person who is responsible for the release of a haz-
ardous substance from a facility is strictly liable, both jointly
and severally,214 for injuries to personal property. One com-
mentator notes that this includes "relocation costs, loss of
209. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.03, subd. l(a)(2) (West Supp. 1984). See Espel,
supra note 49, at 410-11 & nn.27-28. Cf. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Co.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1113 (D. Minn. 1982).
210. See Espel, supra note 49, at 411.
211. MINN. STAT. Ar. § 115B.03, subd. 3, (West Supp. 1984) provides:
Owner of real property. An owner of real property is not a person responsible
for the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility in
or on the property unless that person:
(a) was engaged in the business of generating, transporting, storing, treat-
ing, or disposing of a hazardous substance at the facility or disposing of waste
at the facility, or knowingly permitted others to engage in such a business at
the facility;
(b) knowingly permitted any person to make regular use of the facility for
disposal of waste;
(c) knowingly permitted any person to use the facility for disposal of a
hazardous substance;
(d) knew or reasonably should have known that a hazardous substance was
located in or on the facility at the time right, title, or interest in the property
was first acquired by the person and engaged in conduct by which he associ-
ated himself with the release; or
(e) took action which significantly contributed to the release after he knew
or reasonably should have known that a hazardous substance was located in or
on the facility.
212. See Espel, supra note 49, at 411-12 & nn.31 & 33 (citing in part RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 838, 839 (1977)).
213. Espel, supra note 49, at 422.
214. Id. at 424 & n.108 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § I15B.05 subd. 1 (West Supp.
1984)).
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use of real or personal property, loss of past or future income
and the loss of profits resulting from injury to, the destruc-
tion of, or the loss of real or personal property without re-
gard to the ownership of the property. ' 215 MERLA also
allows for the recovery of damages for death, personal injury
or disease, loss of past or future income, loss of earning ca-
pacity and damages for pain and suffering including physi-
cal impairment.216 There is, however, no provision allowing
for the recovery of punitive damages.217
Unlike Minnesota, Wisconsin has not yet enacted any
comprehensive statute covering cleanup and civil tort liabil-
ity for inactive and active hazardous waste sites, waste gen-
erators and waste handlers. Although a few statutes concern
the transfer of responsibility of ownership of hazardous
waste facilities218 and the financial responsibility require-
ments necessary in the sale of a hazardous waste facility,2 19
no thorough statutory scheme exists in the nature of Minne-
sota's MERLA. One Wisconsin statute concerning the lia-
bility of mining companies provides that a "company is
liable for damages for mining-related injuries ...regard-
less of any change in the nature of the ownership of the in-
terests in the prospecting or mining site, refinery or smelter
held by the mining company and regardless of any reorgani-
zation, merger, consolidation or liquidation affecting the
mining company. ' 220 However, while this could provide a
statutory basis for a hazardous waste injury claim in Wis-
consin, it obviously limits its use only to hazardous waste
claims originating from mining operations.
States like Wisconsin will undoubtedly feel pressure to
address the need for a comprehensive environmental re-
sponse and liability act and may be inclined to consider
Minnesota's as an example. However, one commentator
feels that MERLA represents a collection of compromises,
inconsistencies and ambiguities that may discourage its use
215. Espel, supra note 49, at 431.
216. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 116B.05, subd. 1).
217. Espel, supra note 49, at 431.
218. Wis. STAT. § 144.442 (1981-82).
219. Wis. STAT. § 144.443(10) (1981-82).
220. Wis. STAT. § 107.32 (1981-82).
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as a credible model for legislative efforts in other states.22'
V. CONCLUSION
As litigation increases in the area of toxic waste, plaintiffs
will increasingly look to the common law for theoretical
foundations on which to base their claims. While the few
federal and state statutes controlling the disposition and lia-
bility for these hazardous substances will certainly become
the focal point of many future law suits, the lack of any stat-
utory remedies for the injured plaintiff insures that the com-
mon law of torts, and especially that of nuisance, will be the
mainstay of most successful legal arguments for relief.
The traditional rule of corporate successor liability, to-
gether with its four exceptions, appears to be solidly estab-
lished in Wisconsin and throughout the United States. A
succeeding corporation will be held liable for the damages
from the nuisance or other toxic torts of its predecessor only
if it falls within one of the four exceptions to the traditional
rule of nonliability. In addition, the successor may be liable
for the post-sale damages that result from a nuisance already
on the property by adopting and continuing this nuisance of
the former corporation. In some such cases, responsibility
may be imposed for future damages as well. In other words,
a separate and unrelated corporation that in good faith suc-
ceeds to a substantial portion of a former corporation's as-
sets will not be liable for the toxic waste damages caused by
the former without a specific assumption of this liability by
agreement. Also, in Wisconsin and in many other jurisdic-
tions, mere ownership per se, without notice and continua-
tion of a waste site nuisance already on the land, will not
impose liability for post-purchase damages. Rather, in
many courts the acts of adoption and continuance of a dump
site nuisance by failure to abate it upon request are required
for liability.
Notwithstanding these general rules, there is no doubt
that as the growing problem of harmful waste causes even
more widespread increases in human suffering and economic
hardship, public policy will play a greater role in determina-
22 1. Espel, supra note 49, at 407.
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tions of liability. It seems unlikely that the courts and the
state legislatures will leave a severely injured individual or
community completely devoid of any chance of recovery
while a healthy successor protects its pocket through the
traditional rules. The enormity of the waste problem, and
the severe lack of information on the location, origin, con-
tent and effects of these chemical wastes across the nation,
may lead future courts toward a gradual renunciation of the
traditional successorship doctrine so well established in cor-
porate and tort law. Thus, the current statutory responses of
RCRA and CERCLA which impose "mere ownership" lia-
bility may gain more support in the state courts and legisla-
tures at the expense of the traditional rules. While the
precise statutory approaches may vary significantly, states
may eventually follow Minnesota's lead and enact their own
legislation to establish liability and compensation. However,
at present it is still necessary to give close consideration to
the traditional common-law rules whenever a state court
case involves a victim compensation claim arising from a
hazardous waste disposal site.
PETER B. KELLY
1984]
